

# Immigration Trends Analysis

**RESEARCH**



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## FOREWORD

This research was produced for the Pacific Immigration Development Community (PIDC). It is one of a series of research products developed by PIDC to support decision makers in immigration agencies from Pacific Island Countries and Territories. The research products provide information in key immigration areas that will allow PIDC Members to strengthen the management of international travel across their borders.

PIDC Research currently falls into two categories.

- The first category consists of a number of model technical documents representing international standards and regional best practices that Members can adapt as appropriate for domestic purposes. These model resources currently provide immigration specific technical advice on model legislation, model Standard Operating Procedures, and a model Code of Conduct.
- The second category provides information designed to support PIDC decision makers and leadership in key immigration areas. These products provide PICT immigration agencies with knowledge on specific immigration matters to guide national and regional initiatives and responses. To date PIDC research products have been developed on Pacific Island immigration policy drivers, labour mobility, migration trends, domestic immigration strategic and operational frameworks, and international border 'primary line' best practices.

All the research products developed by PIDC are living documents that will be constantly reviewed and updated to ensure they remain relevant to the needs of the membership. They will form the basis of PIDC's approach to technical matters and will often be the first step for Members when seeking to develop national evidence-based policy and operational reforms.

We wish you well in the use of these products.

PIDC Head of Secretariat

Ioane Alama

### Disclaimer

While the information contained in this document was compiled at the request of the PIDC, it does not necessarily reflect the views of the Organisation unless specifically stated in the text. The information provided is the result of research undertaken by technical immigration experts who have been provided the opportunity to engage with immigration agencies from across the Pacific Island Countries and Territories to learn from their often unique experiences.

## Pacific Immigration Development Community

The Pacific Immigration Development Community was established in 1996 and collectively seeks to ensure the secure international movement of people in the region to maintain safe and prosperous Pacific Communities.

As a regional organisation made up of immigration agencies from 21 Pacific Island Countries and Territories, PIDC seeks to advance the Forum Leaders Pacific Vision for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy, and productive lives. To this end, PIDC works collaboratively to:

- improve the management of international people movement;
- strengthen border management and security; and
- work together to build capacity to deliver immigration services.

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## 1. Introduction

As the COVID-19 crisis shows, any effort to predict trends and create projections into the future can be derailed by phenomena seeming to arise out of nowhere. In the short term, COVID-19 has had a dramatic and almost unprecedented impact on people movements around the world. However, there is a broad consensus that longer term and more deeply rooted trends will reassert themselves eventually. For example, air passenger numbers are expected to rebound strongly and return to pre-COVID-19 levels by 2022 and into 2023, with the Asia Pacific region recovering more quickly than other regions (IATA 2020).

For members of the Pacific Immigration Development Community (PIDC), there will be lessons to learn from the pandemic and processes that may urgently need to be put in place as the situation evolves. These may include ensuring officers working at the border are issued and trained in the use of appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), that advance passenger information systems are able to convey passenger travel history and possibly even relevant health information (relating to testing or vaccination) to enable risk profiling, or working with other departments domestically and internationally and airlines to develop clear policy and protocols on who is and who is not allowed travel.

Such responses are of immediate importance and provide a policy precedent that will enable immigration departments and governments to better respond to future public health issues, epidemics, or even the next pandemic. But, it is the longer term trends that immigration departments need to look to in order to ensure policies and procedures to evolve and be fit for purpose in an ever-changing world. Acknowledging this, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in its strategic vision stresses the need to support governments' "preparedness for emerging issues and the changing dynamics of mobility" (IOM 2019).

This report identifies trends in migration, migration policy and related fields to provide PIDC members with a shared evidence based for national and regional policy discussions. The report is structured with the intention of being an easy to access reference document. It can be used to support briefings and provide background context, particularly in broader areas of migration policy where immigration departments' input is essential, but has not always been sought.

This work is the product of desk-based research and member input through surveys distributed by the PIDC Secretariat in 2019 and 2020.

## 2. Global Migration Overview

There were an estimated 272 million international migrants in the world in 2019 (IOM 2020) in a population of 7.7 billion. This compares to 153 million migrants in 1990 and 84 million in 1970. While these overall numbers have increased significantly, as a percentage of the global population they have remained relatively stable. The number of migrants in 2019 represents merely 3.5 percent of the world's population compared to 2.3 percent in 1970. The vast majority of people continue to live in their country of birth.

Of the international migrants in 2019, 74 percent were considered to be of working age (20-64 years old), and 40 percent of all migrants worldwide were born in Asia. Around 14 percent of all migrants (37.9 million) were under the age of 20. The United States of America continued to be the main country of destination, as it has been since 1970. India was the main country of origin. Approximately two-thirds of the global migrant population resided in high income countries in 2019 (IOM 2020).

### Who is a migrant?

There is no universally agreed definition of a migrant, and definitions can therefore vary between jurisdictions. The UN encourages countries to define an “international migrant” as any person who has changed their country of usual residence, with a further distinction between “short-term migrants” who have changed their country of usual residence for at least three months, but less than one year, and “long-term migrants” who have done so for a minimum of one year (UNDESA 1998). Headline figures therefore include all migrants, whenever they migrated, and regardless of whether they have acquired permanent residency or citizenship.

Business visitors, tourists, and others visiting briefly are not counted in migrant populations.

Cross-border migration flows are much harder to measure than migrant stocks. In addition to the usual challenges of technology and data collection, many countries do not count people who depart, concentrating solely on arrivals. On top of this, it is hard to disaggregate departing migrants from other non-migrant departures such as tourists and business visitors.

From the information that is available, it appears that the flows of people who have recently moved across borders have remained stable. Between 1985 and 1990 approximately 34 million people changed their country of residence; between 2010 and 2015, 36 million people moved across borders. Falling in the middle of these periods, migration flows peaked between 1995 and 2000 at around 43 million (European Political Strategy Centre, 2017).

Tourists and visitors do not count towards migrant totals. However, this category forms the majority of border arrivals for many countries, and global tourism numbers were on an upward trend prior to COVID-19. International tourist arrivals (overnight visitors) worldwide grew 4 percent in 2019 to reach 1.5 billion (UNWTO 2020), and it is estimated that 1.8 billion travellers might cross international borders by 2030 (UNWTO 2016). The impact of COVID-19



will have a greater impact on international tourism than international migrant flows, but the extent and length of impact is difficult to estimate.

Migrant workers totalled an estimated 164 million in 2017. This was equivalent to approximately 70 percent of migrants of working age. Of these migrant workers, 42 percent were female. Migrants were estimated to have transferred USD 689 billion back to their home countries in 2018, up from USD 126 billion in 2000.

By the end of 2018, there were 25.9 million refugees worldwide. Although the growth in the number of refugees has slowed, this is the highest number on record. UNHCR estimates that 52 percent of these refugees are under the age of 18 years. The vast majority of refugees are hosted in countries bordering conflict zones.

A far greater number of people fleeing conflict and violence do not cross international borders, with an estimated 41.3 million people internally displaced by the end of 2018. This is also the highest number on record.

While most migrants move safely and legally, some do not and often take significant risks to cross borders either personally or by putting their fates in the hands of smugglers. IOM began systematically collecting data on migrant deaths in 2014 through their Missing Migrants Project. Between 2014 and 2018, the project recorded over 30,900 children, women and men who lost their lives attempting to reach another country.

People smuggling and human trafficking are hard to measure because of their illicit nature. According to the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC), from 2016 to 2017 there were 40,190 new recorded cases of trafficking in persons registered. There is no indication of the total number of persons trafficked. These registrations record victims as coming from 147 countries with exploitation occurring in 107 countries. The majority of victims (54 percent) were women, 20 percent were girls, 22 percent were men and 5 percent were boys. Just over a quarter were children. Nearly 30 percent were trafficked into forced labour, while 47 percent were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation (CTDC website).



### 3. Pacific Islands Region Overview

Identifying trends for the Pacific region is challenging. In global terms, the numbers of people migrating to or from Pacific Island countries are small, and statistics are often presented for wider regions, such as Oceania or even Asia-Pacific, where Pacific Island migration numbers are lost within the data for much larger populations. In addition, the region itself faces limitations in producing reliable and timely data often due to limited resources.

All PIDC members who responded to the 2020 survey recognised data collection and sharing as a key issue that was being addressed through new border management systems, information-sharing agreements, or ongoing discussions with international partners.

Notably, at the national level arrival and migrant numbers can represent significant proportions of Pacific Island populations, with similarly significant effects on the economy and society. Under normal circumstances, the number of visitors that Fiji welcomes each year is almost the same as the country's resident population: 894,389 visitor arrivals contrasted with a population estimate of 889,327 in 2019 (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 2019). In Tonga, an equivalent to approximately 70 percent of the population were resident overseas in 2019 (IOM 2020).

Indeed, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue and Samoa all noted an increase in cross-border movements arrivals over the last three years, with Kiribati in particular noting an increase in departing citizens, which places additional pressures on limited resources.

According to the World Migration Report (IOM 2020), and including Australia and New Zealand, there were 7.7 million migrants from outside the Oceania region living within it in 2019. The bulk of these migrants were from Asia (49 percent) and Europe (38 percent), with numbers from Asia growing over the last 30 years, and those from Europe remaining relatively stable. There were a further estimated 1.1 million migrants born in the region who had migrated to other countries also within the region (for example from New Zealand to Australia, or Samoa to New Zealand). This number has almost doubled since 1990, rising at a steady rate. There were a similar number of migrants born in Oceania and living outside the region, mostly in North America and Europe.

Over the last 10 years, many Pacific Island countries have experienced continued population growth, with the populations in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands increasing by around 30 percent. This has also led to a "youth bulge", with for example 70 percent of the population in Solomon Islands under the age of 34 (IOM 2020).

Within the region, Australia is characterized by being a major recipient of migrants, while Pacific Island countries are characterized by being migrant source countries with proportionally large numbers of citizens' resident overseas compared to their population size. In 2019, the Federated States of Micronesia had an equivalent to approximately 20 percent of its population resident overseas, Fiji around 25 percent, Samoa around 60 percent, and Tonga about 70 percent (Migration Data Portal). The large shares of Pacific Islands'

populations residing overseas is also referenced in IOM's *Pacific Strategy* which notes that while there are different migration dynamics within Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, in general as with the global trends, "when people choose to migrate, it is in search of economic opportunities, usually with the aim of returning home in the future" (IOM 2017).

The high level of migrants earning income overseas results in high levels of remittances back to family and communities at home, making those major contributors to many Pacific Island economies. For example, in Tonga, remittances account for nearly 38 percent of Gross Domestic Product; just over 16 percent of GDP in Samoa; 14 percent of GDP in RMI; around 10 percent in Kiribati and Tuvalu; and 5 percent in Fiji (World Bank 2020).

In 2018, according to the World Migration Report, there were 126,000 refugees and asylum seekers within Oceania. The large majority of these were hosted by Australia, followed by Papua New Guinea, then New Zealand, and Nauru. However, there were sizable numbers of displaced people within Pacific Island countries due to the impact of disasters. Papua New Guinea's internally displaced population of 61,000 was largely due to earthquakes. Vanuatu's internally displaced population of 13,000 was due to volcanic activity (IOM 2020). Smaller numbers of people have been displaced, if only temporarily, due to the impact of climate related events such as cyclones and saltwater inundation. Such internal displacements have the potential to spill over borders in managed or unmanaged ways.

Reported refusals of entry at the border have generally continued to increase (PIDC 2014). This may indicate improved detection rates or more instances of irregular travel, but is an indicator of more serious crime. Document fraud continues to be detected, with the largest number of fraudulent travellers originating from Asia, and a significant proportion of cases originating within the region (PIDC 2014). Human trafficking, for labour and sexual exploitation, and people smuggling continues to occur throughout the region in what is believed to be small numbers, although information is very limited. The fishing and logging industries are believed to be key drivers.

### Pacific Island region: migration snapshot

Pacific Island countries and territories are largely characterised by geographical remoteness and comparatively small populations. With relatively youthful populations, high levels of underemployment, the impacts of climate change, and a need for economic development, there is a strong demand for labour migration from individuals and governments. Several countries, in particular FSM, Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, have significant proportions of their population living overseas sending back remittances, and opening up opportunities for business and trade. Managed short term migration schemes with Australia and New Zealand have significant support and are growing, as are migration routes to new countries, such as Japan. Skilled labour shortages and international students drive inward migration for some countries, although for many, tourists comprise the vast majority of international arrivals. Irregular migration, particularly as it manifests in human trafficking, is a concern across the region with limited information available to determine its size and effect. Identifying and repatriating overstayers is also a common challenge. Limited resources restrict many immigration departments to operational processing, with little capacity to address evolving policy, legislative and technological needs that increasingly demand a coordinated whole-of-government approach and regional collaboration.

**Annex 1** provides a statistical summary for those Pacific Island countries with data included in the Migration Data Portal, specifically: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, and Palau; and Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu.

## 4. High Level Migration Trends

Migration is not a new phenomenon and the major factors that push and pull people to migrate are also nothing new. As the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants states:

“Since earliest times, humanity has been on the move. Some people move in search of new economic opportunities and horizons. Others move to escape armed conflict, poverty, food insecurity, persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations and abuses. Still others do so in response to the adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters (some of which may be linked to climate change), or other environmental factors. Many move, indeed, for a combination of these reasons.” (UN General Assembly 2016)

What does change over time and location is the varying influence of such factors and the extent to which people are able to take action. Is there a significant wealth disparity between rural and urban areas, between one country and another, between one region and another? Is there conflict in one place, but stability and security somewhere else? And, if so, how easy is it to make the journey between the two?

The IOM Strategic Vision, 2019-2023 explores the likely drivers of migration in the next decade. These drivers broadly correlate with Ten Trends Shaping Migration, identified by the European Political Strategy Centre in 2017. The following summarises and synthesises the trends highlighted in these two sources. The following sections will explore the most relevant of these trends in more detail and in the Pacific context.

- Migration will increasingly be recognised as needing a whole-of-government approach. Whether looking to support economic growth, respond to youth unemployment, care for an aging population, or combat crime, migration issues are interwoven through economic, social, and security policy, and governments that work in silos will find it hardest to respond. Similarly, regional and international cooperation will become more important in dealing with these challenges and changing trends, not just between governments, but also with the private sector and other non-state actors.
- The global migrant population will grow, but flows will remain stable, with regional and national demographics a key push/pull factor. Movements are likely to remain within regions rather than between regions, and be characterised by continued movement from rural to urban areas.

- Economic development will continue to spur migration with labour market demands leading to a greater emphasis on migration schemes that manage migrants before and after entry, with increased expectations that such schemes will also drive economic development in sending countries.
- Transnational lifestyles will become more common as migrants retain links in more than one country simultaneously, with community, work, and financial connectivity extending across national borders. Transnational lifestyles will also be evident in visitor growth through tourism, business, or visiting family.
- Climate change will dominate all other drivers of migration as people are affected by climate-induced disasters, and as some places become uninhabitable due to desertification, sea-level rise, and resource scarcity. Such changes will also fuel or exacerbate armed conflict and persecution forcing further displacement.
- Technological developments and expanding connectivity will lead to increasing use of electronic means to manage borders, issue visas, and establish identity; while also providing migrants with timely information and a means to communicate before, during and after their journeys. Data security and privacy will become ever more important issues.
- The same technological developments have the power to shape perceptions, especially through social media platforms, with the risk of spreading negative sentiment towards migrants, even inciting violence, and can be a source of misinformation to the general public and migrants.
- The most disadvantaged often do not have the means to take advantage of legal migration, and will continue to be vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers and smugglers, as irregular migration becomes increasingly big business. At the same time migrant smuggling is increasingly associated with serious human rights violations and deaths, while smuggling networks are linked to other forms of serious and organised crime, including money laundering, drug and human trafficking, even slavery.

Within the region, PIDC surveyed their members in 2019 and again in 2020. The responses to these surveys highlight several common and interconnected challenges faced by member immigration departments. The ability of immigration departments to address these challenges will impact their ability to respond to regional and global trends.

- **Resources.** Both human and financial resources are limited for many Pacific Island immigration departments. This leads to a focus on core operations relating to managing borders, particularly with a view to enforcement and activities that raise revenue. Departments' facilitation role, policy, regulatory review, and training functions receive less prominence. Consequently, it can be difficult for departments

to engage with broader government policy as it relates to immigration, keep abreast of evolving trends and technological advancements, and ensure frontline officers have up to date training.

- **Training.** There is recognition across the region that immigration officers need ongoing training to maintain and build skills, and to keep pace with the increasing sophistication of document and identity fraud. While there is significant experience and expertise within the region, it can be difficult for departments to tap into this.
- **Technology.** Immigration departments recognise the importance of utilising technology, but technology is evolving at a pace faster than the most well-resourced governments can keep up with. Pacific Island immigration departments have limited resources to invest in designing systems, aligning processes, and managing change. This makes adopting technology, such as electronic border management systems, challenging and risks expenditure on systems that are not fit for purpose.
- **Information-sharing.** Information is crucial to effective border management, but a number of immigration departments feel they do not receive adequate information for effective risk assessment and border management, whether that is receiving advance passenger information or being able to access Interpol databases.
- **International partnerships.** Collaboration with international agencies and regional partners is a source of strength for the region and plays a key role in providing the finance and technical expertise to review legislation, deliver training, and introduce new systems.

Progress is being made on many of these fronts with most PIDC members either reporting positive changes over the last three years, and/or recognising these as areas of concern.

## 5. A Regional Spotlight

This section explores the high level migration trends outlined in the previous section and provides a specific focus on the Pacific Islands region.

### A whole-of-government approach

Migration is increasingly being recognized as a cross-cutting issue that requires a whole-of-government approach. Policy responses to unemployment, climate change, organized crime, economic growth, public health and disaster response for example, should all take into consideration how international people movements and border policies and procedures may support or hinder the desired outcomes.

The complexity of dealing with evolving trends discourages countries from forming policy in the first place, or leads to them continuously introducing new or adapting existing migration policies. As noted by ICMPD (2019), any corresponding policy-making processes rarely follow ideal policy cycles. They are disrupted or influenced by upcoming elections, public opinion or crises. Furthermore, migration policies are often developed in a highly politicised environment, and there can be considerable gaps between research findings, public perceptions, and eventual policy responses.

Immigration departments are often the experts in understanding the mechanisms by which people travel, and are well-placed to understand the impact of policy decisions on all aspects of border management and vice versa, including asylum, irregular migration, labour migration and visa regulations, security, return and readmission. It is important that immigration departments are connected to wider discussions across government to support effective policy.

Border officials are also uniquely positioned at an operational level to identify instances of people smuggling and human trafficking. For example, immigration departments are often one of the few official agencies to come into contact with fishing crews and are well-positioned to liaise with labour departments and the police regarding observed or reported abuses (PIDC 2014). Cross-agency working and information sharing at a national and regional level, and having the legislation and protocols in place to support this, can be key whether in response to protecting victims and prosecuting traffickers, detecting drug trafficking, or identifying and responding to the arrival of a registered child sex-offender, or a known member of an outlaw motor cycle gang.

The inclusion of specific references to migration within the Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by all UN Member States in 2015, and in particular the target to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies” as a key element in reducing inequalities has given additional impetus to multilateral working between



governments and international agencies. This process has also led to UN Member States agreeing the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in 2018, with its objectives for better managing migration at local, national, regional and global levels.

Recognising the need for a joined-up approach, Tonga is currently developing a Migration and Sustainable Development Policy. Similarly, Fiji is developing a Migration Profile. Both countries are aiming to document and analyse international and internal migration and its various economic and societal impacts. Technical Working Groups have been established in each country, supported by IOM, comprising of government ministries working across different sectors, to facilitate discussion, prioritization and policy development (IOM 2019).

## Demographics and Migration

While there are differences between Pacific Island countries and between the sub-regions of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, it is expected that the current demographics, and in particular growing educated youth populations, will drive increasing demand for employment opportunities overseas. Growing populations will also put more pressure on local resources, at a time when those resources are likely to be under increasing stress due to climate change. This too will drive the desire and need for internal and cross-border migration.

Ageing populations in many receiving countries and labour shortages in particular sectors will create demand for migrant labour. With most movements taking place intra-regionally, where distances are shorter and countries of destination are well understood, migrant labour from Melanesia and Polynesia will likely continue to flow to Australia and New Zealand. For Micronesia and the northern Pacific, ties to North America, may have a stronger influence.

These outflows are likely to continue to be substantially larger than inward migration flows. However, opportunities for investment, lifestyle choices, and continued growth in tourism and its support services, once the COVID-19 crisis is resolved, in addition to international jobs within the development field will support a steady flow of migrants into Pacific Island countries usually in skilled categories, and filling gaps in the labour market.

**Annex 1** provides a summary of information on specific Pacific Island countries as contained within the Migration Data Portal (<https://migrationdataportal.org/>).

## Economic Development and Managed Migration

At the heart of all immigration policies is a balance between protecting the rights, security, health, and employment of citizens, and the benefits of labour migration to migrants, communities, employers, governments, and the economy at large. When labour migration is managed well it benefits host countries, sending countries, and workers alike.

For host countries it helps address critical labour shortages, especially within the context of ageing populations and changing labour demographics. In the Pacific context, skilled labour

migration can be crucial in supporting government services, such as health and education, through the provision of doctors or teachers, including in the provision of tertiary education; it is also key to enabling parts of the economy to thrive. Skilled labour can drive growth and domestic employment, and may be a necessary part of maintaining consistency of standards for multinational companies. Appropriate investor migration routes also support innovation, employment and growth within economies.

Pacific Island countries are mostly net sending countries, and through this avenue national unemployment or underemployment can be reduced, remittance flows can contribute to development, skills can be brought back, businesses created, and trade networks expanded. In the last 10 years in the Pacific, the concept of labour migration has been increasingly viewed in the context of the development agenda, with a growing focus on managed migration schemes as a key route to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

A World Bank published report described labour mobility as “a potential \$US10 billion prize for the Pacific” (Curtain et al 2016) and since 2007, seasonal labour migration schemes have helped to relieve underemployment in the Pacific, with New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme and Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme in 2012, both aimed at meeting labour shortages mainly in the horticulture and viticulture industries. During the 2017-2018 season more than 9,600 people from the Pacific Islands were granted visas under the RSE scheme and more than 8,000 under Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme (IOM 2020). The Pacific Labour Scheme was introduced in 2018 to fill gaps in low- and semi-skilled jobs in both rural and regional Australia and is further contributing to increasing levels of labour migration from the Pacific to Australia and New Zealand. However, opportunities are also increasing to other destinations, with for example, Fijians and Tongans moving to countries such as Japan (IOM 2020). Some projections indicate that there may be as many as 750,000 Pacific migrants abroad by 2040, up from 420,000 in 2016, potentially leading to a doubling of per capita income growth for PNG and Solomon Islands, triple income growth for Vanuatu, and quintuple income growth for Kiribati (Curtain et al 2016).

For workers, migration gives them the opportunity to increase their income, to learn new skills, and to improve the standard of living and lifestyle of themselves, their families, and their communities. More emphasis is being placed on encouraging workers who migrate, to return to their home countries and bring their skills and knowledge to the economy. Fiji’s reintroduction of dual citizenship in 2009 was in part designed to encourage long term migrants to more easily strengthen connections and look for opportunities back in Fiji. Shorter term managed migration schemes have this concept inbuilt.

Importantly, there are also governance challenges associated with labour migration (IOM 2017c). For Pacific Islands countries with relatively small populations, a key concern is the potential for skills shortages at home as workers, and particularly skilled workers migrate, which can also lead to wage inflation, combined with a social and cultural impact on families left behind (FAO and SPC 2019). It is also not uncommon across the Pacific to encounter stories of deceptive and non-transparent recruitment practices by unregulated recruiters, who promise high wages for overseas jobs in return for a fee. The Royal British Legion recently

warned against a current scam (FBC 2020). For receiving countries, mismatched conditions between migrant and national workers, with migrants filling senior positions or displacing lower skilled workers, can create social tensions. It can also be hard to monitor migrant labour, particular when it is partly out of sight on construction sites or in agricultural areas, to ensure worker's rights are protected and they are not being exploited.

Immigration departments play a pivotal role in ensuring that labour migration is well-managed. They are a lead agency in verifying documents and more importantly the identities connected to those documents, whether at the border or through, for example, assessing work permit, student permit or visa applications. They are responsible for investigating and enforcing immigration law at the border and within borders, alongside the police and labour inspectors. As the department often responsible for issuing passports they are also the gatekeepers to enabling citizens to participate in safe and dignified labour mobility. The application process and required documentation can place barriers and discriminate against citizens seeking to gain a passport.

Detecting irregular migrants at the border can allow PIDC members to shift the costs of return to the airlines and generally facilitate a rapid turnaround, with arrivals that are refused entry being placed directly on the return flight (PIDC 2014). Immigration officers need appropriate powers through legislation to enforce a rapid turnaround, and the training to ensure these powers are used correctly. Some Pacific Island countries have powers to refuse entry based on character, which have been used to turn around at the border, for example, known members of criminal gangs (PTCN 2020). Once in-country the costs and logistics associated with removing migrants to their home countries can be prohibitive, including challenges in getting transit permissions from third countries. Where migrants overstay their work or student visas, but present no other risk the cost considerations related to enforcement can risk leaving migrants stranded. Notably, in this context, over 90 percent of PIDC members do not have appropriate immigration detention facilities (PIDC 2014).

With flows of labour migrants expected to increase, it is essential that immigration departments' practical experience of how migration actually happens and the means by which legal migration routes can be improved or circumvented is fed into national policy development.

In this context it should also be noted that immigration departments are sometimes viewed as revenue raising agencies that contribute to government funds through application fees for permits and passports. The need to raise revenue can be an additional factor in determining migration policy.

## Transnational Lifestyles and Tourism

Migrants continue to be connected to their home nations and communities through technology and the low cost and ease of international travel. These same factors encourage tourists to travel internationally, conferences to be held overseas, and business visitors to

come and go as development plans encourage stronger links with key markets. Similarly, as more and more jobs can be done from anywhere in the world with a good internet connection, without requiring a worker to commute to an office, it has become increasingly possible for people to travel and work simultaneously.

While COVID-19 has had a dramatic impact on these trends in the short term, the expectation at the time of writing is that international travel will bounce back in 2021. With more people and workplaces now used to remote working, it is possible that remote working will increase, and the number of digital nomads will accelerate.

Of importance to immigration departments, is the extent to which their visa, work, student and resident permit policies are relevant to a world where easier international travel can result in mixed flows, a greater variety of source countries, and multiple reasons for a cross-border journey. For example, do countries want to facilitate or deter a wealthy Nigerian IT consultant, who can work wherever there is an internet connection, but wants to explore the Pacific, and surf and dive in his spare time, over a two-month stay? Is he a tourist or a business visitor? If he is working does he need a permit? Can he get a visa on arrival?

Barbados has taken an innovative approach to remote working by introducing the Barbados Welcome Stamp visa with the tagline “Work from Paradise”. The visa, introduced in June 2020, is specifically designed for digital nomads. It costs USD 2,000 for individuals and USD 3,000 for families, and lasts for 12 months with the opportunity to stay for longer. Applicants are exempt from paying local income tax but are forbidden from working for Barbados employers. (<https://www.barbadoswelcomestamp.bb/>).

For a number of Pacific Island countries, tourism plays a key role in the economy (accounting, for example, for approximately 40 percent of Fiji’s GDP), and the ease of entry is an important factor in encouraging tourists or tour agents to arrange travel. Countries, including Palau and Vanuatu are also increasingly examining the type of tourists they wish to attract. More attention is being paid to how much money is retained within economies in mass tourism models that focus on cruise ships and large hotel chains, versus the impact on communities, local services, and environments. This is a national conversation that immigration departments should be part of.

As with managed migration, policies relating to visitor arrivals are also a balance between security and economic benefit. RMI, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, have all recently reviewed or are in the process of reviewing their visa policies with the support of ACP-EU Migration Action.

## Migration in the context of Climate Change

Pacific Island countries are some of the most vulnerable to the impacts of a changing climate, with increasing exposure to severe tropical storms, sea-level rise, salt-water intrusion, and a shortage of freshwater. These factors and the anticipation of them is already driving migration

both within and between countries as people choose or are forced to move. As the effects of these impacts increase, it is anticipated that more people will move.

Movements of people in the context of climate change are viewed in three ways: in the context of security, where particularly concerns about mass movements of people to new countries fuels concerns about their impact; in the context of protection, focusing on the rights of individuals who have migrated and their vulnerability; and in the context of adaptation and risk management, where planned upskilling populations and migration programmes offer opportunities for labour migration (IOM 2020). Such schemes are considered critical migration pathways in the context of climate change in the Pacific (UNESCAP & ILO 2014).

Kiribati has promoted the “migration with dignity” policy as a long-term adaptation measure, aiming to facilitate both permanent and temporary labour migration on a voluntary basis.

As explained in the World Migration Report, the “idea centres on boosting education standards so that migrants can compete in the international labour markets and on strengthening networks with the diaspora in the region to create new opportunities and support new arrivals. It is hoped that such flows of people could reduce the strain on households and environmental resources, and provide financial and social remittances to enable other forms of adaptation” (IOM 2020). The aim is to give people control over whether, when, where and how they move, or stay. Existing labour mobility schemes such as the RSE, Seasonal Workers Programme, and the Pacific Labour Scheme, are already being consciously implemented with a view to climate adaptation.

At a national level, Fiji’s Planned Relocation Guidelines (2018) are a notable attempt to provide a planning framework for managing the movement of people. The guidelines state that relocation is a last resort, to be considered “after all other feasible adaptation options have been explored”. Should it occur, it needs to ensure long-term economic sustainability, support and services, and the protection of the rights and well-being of vulnerable groups. The guidelines also describe the steps that should be taken, such as consultations with all affected stakeholders, including people moving, host communities and those choosing not to move (IOM 2020).

While these guidelines are designed for internal displacement they highlight many of the issues Pacific Island countries may need to consider in determining policies to support their neighbours or as part of a regional approach. In 2019, Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, RMI, and Vanuatu, with the support of IOM initiated the Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security programme to develop a regional response and develop an evidence base for effective policy-making (IOM 2019d).

## Disaster Response

With the possibility of severe tropical cyclones becoming more frequent due to climate change, in addition to risks of other natural events such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions,

and tsunamis, to which Pacific Island countries are vulnerable, it is important that immigration policy and procedures can cope with a rapid influx of disaster response workers with minimal bureaucracy, while ensuring effective security checks are maintained to screen any person seeking to take advantage of the situation to gain entry.

## Asylum Seekers and Refugees

There are six Pacific Island countries that are contracting States to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol the Refugee Convention: Fiji, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. Of these countries, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Nauru and Vanuatu have enacted refugee-specific national legislation and accompanying regulations.

Apart from Papua New Guinea and Nauru, the number of asylum seekers and refugees in the region is small, reflecting the remoteness of PIDC member countries and territories. However, the vulnerability of refugees and the imperative for protection means that there will be ongoing encouragement for all Pacific Island countries to identify and formally recognise refugees along with their particular needs, and not return them to a place where they have a well-founded fear of persecution.

It is important that immigration officers have an understanding of what it means to be an asylum seeker or a refugee and be able to distinguish them from other categories of migrant, and also be aware of the support that UNHCR can provide should the need arise to determine whether a person is a refugee.

## Evolving Technology

Keeping pace with technology is a challenge. The region and its supporting institutions struggle to implement and provide ongoing support to IT-based solutions. While such solutions are attractive and may streamline procedures, they are a risky investment without plans and finance to maintain and update hardware and software over time. In the immigration context, project funding may support the cost of a new Border Management System (BMS), but the cost of ongoing maintenance, including of appropriate facilities to house hardware such as servers, need to be budgeted for over the lifetime of the system. This is a region-wide, if not global, issue, and extends across governments where there are limited resources to invest in IT and where IT support is both expensive and scarce.

For example, in 2016 a baseline report for RMI's Division of Immigration noted the need for a BMS. The report also noted that US assistance had previously supported the installation of a system which had broken down two years previously with no maintenance contract in place to keep it going, and prior to that Australia had supported some IT infrastructure (Mills 2016). In 2019, RMI launched the Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) after extensive support from IOM over the previous 10 months.

Technology at the border and in identity recognition will continue to evolve. For example, an IATA project called 'One ID' is aiming to create a stream-lined process for airline passengers where digital biometric recognition potentially replaces the ePassport. In contrast many countries, including some in the Pacific, continue to face challenges in accessing Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Records, and connecting to Interpol databases (PIDC 2019).

The risk for Pacific Island countries is that there is likely to be an increasing divide between the technological haves and have nots, likely to be most evident in "strong" and "weak" passports, but also in "strong" and "weak" borders, depending on the level of technology deployed. Regional and international cooperation will be required to ensure Pacific Islanders do not find it increasingly difficult to travel, and to ensure Pacific Island borders are not increasingly targeted.

Alongside the digitisation of almost everything there are growing concerns about when personal is being captured, how it is being used and stored, and who has access to it. Demands for governments to ensure data protection and privacy are likely to continue to grow. Immigration departments handle sensitive personal information and documentation daily and are increasingly storing data electronically. Pacific Island countries and regional organisations will need to respond appropriately.

## Perceptions of Migration

In recent years, immigration has become an increasingly contentious topic, with politicians playing on people's concerns to garner votes. A combination of rising numbers of migrants combined with worsening economic conditions are often considered to be the source of tensions; however research suggests that fears are often exaggerated by widespread misperceptions regarding actual figures and facts. On average, people overestimate the size of immigrant populations living in their country, often by a wide margin. With many people getting their information from alternative online sources instead of the traditional media, there is risk of exaggeration or even untruths, which in turn can exacerbate anti-immigration sentiment (European Political Strategy Centre 2017).

The challenge for PIDC members is to continue to improve the collection of data and the timely publication of reliable migration statistics in order to provide an evidence base for policy development and to shape public debate.

## Human Trafficking and People Smuggling

While the majority of people crossing borders will continue to be low risk, comprising citizens, residents, tourists, business travellers, and development workers, a small proportion will continue to be of higher risk. Identifying and appropriately responding is both a current and a future challenge.



For immigration officers these risks typically relate to identifying those seeking to enter irregularly, with false documents or identities or by bypassing immigration controls and seeking to transit or remain, or those who enter regularly, but who overstay the length of their permits. Several PIDC members listed these as issues of concern in their 2020 survey responses. In many of these instances there is no manifest danger to the general population or to the individuals themselves. A well-managed migration policy can further reduce risks by providing reasonable avenues for people to seek entry and employment or switch categories while in-country.

In amongst these flows, immigration departments are increasingly expected to work with police to be prepared for and to identify more serious cases of people smuggling and human trafficking, potentially involving criminal networks. However, while it is known that the Pacific Island region is a source, transit and destination point for both trafficking and smuggling there is very little data available, although there is a widespread concern that it is increasing. The increasing incidences of border refusals, returns and immigration related fraud in the region supports this perspective (PIDC 2014).

An IOM report (2019b) noted that “most sources identify the trafficking of young women to some port cities or to mining and logging sites as the main irregular migration issue affecting some parts of the region, including RMI, Kiribati, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. This mostly involves young women from China, the Philippines and Thailand who are recruited for legitimate work but are sometimes sexually exploited. Some women move to the region and engage in the sex industry voluntarily; such cases are better described as migrant smuggling if women use paid services to enter the Pacific Islands illegally”. Fishing vessels and crews are also believed to play a role in both trafficking and smuggling with evidence of movement of persons around the Pacific through Fiji, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands (PIDC 2014).

At the Human Trafficking and Child Exploitation workshop in Fiji in 2019, IOM stated that previously victims of trafficking identified in Fiji were only from China and the Philippines, but that they were now identifying victims from Thailand and other countries. IOM’s view was that trafficking was increasing, but that numbers are hard to know (Nacei 2019). Vanuatu also identified a large number of Bangladeshi victims of trafficking who arrived in the country in 2018 and became stranded. Bangladeshi victims have also been reported in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Samoa (PTCN 2020).

The US Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons report 2020, includes eight PIDC members (excluding Australia and New Zealand), only three of which are signatories to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and Children. The report places countries in tiers based on their efforts to eliminate trafficking. Micronesia, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu are all classified in Tier 2, meaning that while they do not meet minimum standards, they are making significant efforts to do so. Fiji and RMI were placed on the Tier 2 Watchlist, meaning that they are making efforts to meet minimum standards, but numbers of victims are high or increasing, or there was no evidence of progress from previous years. Papua New Guinea was classified in Tier 3, meaning that the

US believes they are not making significant efforts to meet minimum standards. Being placed in Tier 3 can limit the development assistance the US is able to provide to a country.

Multilateral forums such as the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, will be increasingly important for Pacific Island countries to engage in to be able to effectively counter these crimes.

## Other Transnational Organised Crime

A 2016 UNODC report identified four major types of transnational organised crime affecting the Pacific region. These were: drug and precursor trafficking, the trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, environmental crimes (fishery crime and other wildlife trafficking, and illegal logging and timber trafficking); and small arms trafficking. According to the report there were strong indications that Pacific Island countries are increasingly targeted by criminal groups due to several vulnerabilities, including: the geographical location of Pacific Island countries between major sources and destinations of illicit commodities; extensive and porous jurisdictional boundaries; and the differences and variability in governance and law enforcement capacity across the region (UNODC 2016).

Increasingly, immigration departments and other border agencies are tasked with identifying such criminal activity, and ultimately assessing risks to the broader security of their country or region (ICMPD 2018), and just as technological change is providing governments with new tools to detect criminal activity and manage borders, so too is it providing organised crime groups with new tools to circumvent the law.

An ongoing challenge for several PIDC members is the cross-border movement of known criminal gang members with ties in the Pacific, particularly from outlawed motorcycle gangs, and ensuring they are identified at the border either to refuse entry or to supply the information to other agencies, such as the police and the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre. Chinese, Colombian, and Italian criminal gangs are also known to use small vessels to move drugs through the region, using in particular Fiji and Papua New Guinea for transshipment, which is resulting in growing local markets (PTCN 2020).

Concerns have also been expressed about the commercial sexual exploitation of children within the Pacific, and the risk of displacement as tougher measures are introduced in sex tourism destinations in Asia. At the moment, there is limited evidence of this trend occurring (PIDC 2014). New Zealand has reported an increase in travel to the Pacific of registered child sex offenders, but notes that such travel can be fully legitimate (PTCN 2020). Improved dialogue with civil society organisations is important. They are better connected to their communities than government agencies and will often have a much clearer picture of what is happening on the ground.

Immigration departments need to work increasingly effectively across agencies and borders to share information, to learn and to build the skills, in order to contribute to tackling this complex nexus of transnational criminal activity.

## 6. Concluding Summary

A snapshot of migration in the region is provided in section 3 in an effort to provide a clear and succinct overview of trends. This snapshot is repeated here:

Pacific Island countries and territories are largely characterised by geographical remoteness and comparatively small populations. With relatively youthful populations, high levels of underemployment, the impacts of climate change, and a need for economic development, there is a strong demand for labour migration from individuals and governments. Several countries, in particular FSM, Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, have significant proportions of their population living overseas sending back remittances, and opening up opportunities for business and trade. Managed short term migration schemes with Australia and New Zealand have significant support and are growing, as are migration routes to new countries, such as Japan. Skilled labour shortages and international students drive inward migration for some countries, although for many, tourists comprise the vast majority of international arrivals. Irregular migration, particularly as it manifests in human trafficking, is a concern across the region with limited information available to determine its size and effect. Identifying and repatriating overstayers is also a common challenge. Limited resources restrict many immigration departments to operational processing, with little capacity to address evolving policy, legislative and technological needs that increasingly demand a coordinated whole-of-government approach and regional collaboration.

This report identified the following high level migration trends from various sources, including PIDC members survey responses, and provided a specific focus on the Pacific Islands region.

**A whole-of-government approach:** Supporting or limiting the movement of people across borders can greatly influence the success of major government policy in response to, for example, unemployment, climate change, organised crime, economic growth, public health and disaster response. As this is increasingly recognised, immigration departments are increasingly expected to work to support the development of effective policy across government, as well as coordinating and sharing information across agencies at an operational level.

**Demographics and migration:** Although there is national and sub-regional variation, growing populations, and in particular growing educated youth populations, will put pressure on already stretched resources, and drive demand for employment opportunities which are likely to be only met through accessing overseas job markets, where demand is projected to grow. Inward migration is likely to continue due to opportunities for investment, lifestyle

choices, continued growth in tourism and its support services, development-related jobs, and skills shortages.

**Economic development and managed migration:** At the heart of all immigration policies is a balance between protecting the rights, security, health, and employment of citizens, and the benefits of labour migration to migrants, communities, employers, governments, and the economy at large. Inward skilled labour migration supports government services, such as health and education, through the provision of doctors or teachers and lecturers, can drive growth, create jobs, and ensure quality standards. Appropriate investor migration routes also support innovation, employment and growth within economies. Outward employment migration reduces unemployment at home, supports remittance flows, upskills workers, and can introduce innovation back into the sending country. The World Bank has described labour mobility as a US\$10 billion prize for the Pacific. However, such flows can also exacerbate skills shortages, increase worker exploitation, and encourage scams. It is essential that immigration departments' practical experience of how migration actually happens and the means by which legal migration routes can be improved or circumvented is fed into national policy development.

**Transnational lifestyles and tourism:** Developments in technology, the low cost of international travel, and the growth of jobs that are not tied to workplaces, contributes to increasingly mixed flows of migrants from a wider range of source countries and the blurring of lines between traditional categories of traveller. Of importance to immigration departments, is the extent to which their visa, work, student and resident permit policies are fit for purpose, and the extent to which innovative approaches to, for example, welcoming digital nomads should be considered.

**Migration in the context of climate change:** The impacts of climate change and the anticipation of them is already driving migration both within and between countries as people choose or are forced to move. As the effects of these impacts increase, it is anticipated that more people will move. IOM notes that these movements are viewed through three different lenses: security, which considers the impacts of possible mass movements on host countries; protection, which considers the rights and vulnerability of those forced to move; and adaptation and risk management, which considers upskilling and migration programmes to preempt forced movements. More specifically, given the region's existing vulnerability to natural events, and the likely increase in severity of cyclones due to climate change, it is important for immigration procedures to be responsive to the urgent processing of disaster response workers.

**Asylum seekers and refugees:** The vulnerability of refugees and the imperative for protection means that there will be ongoing encouragement for all Pacific Island countries to identify and formally recognise refugees along with their particular needs, and not return them to a place where they have a well-founded fear of persecution. It is important that immigration officers have an understanding of what it means to be an asylum seeker or a refugee and be able to distinguish them from other categories of migrant, and also be aware of the support that UNHCR can provide should the need arise to determine whether a person is a refugee.

**Evolving technology:** Technology at the border and in identity recognition will continue to evolve and there is likely to be an increasing divide between the technological haves and have nots, likely to be most evident in “strong” and “weak” passports, but also in “strong” and “weak” borders. The region and its supporting institutions struggle to implement and provide ongoing support to IT-based solutions. While such solutions are attractive and may streamline procedures, they are a risky investment without plans and finance to maintain and update hardware and software over time. Regional and international cooperation will be required to ensure Pacific Islanders do not find it increasingly difficult to travel and to ensure Pacific Island borders are not increasingly targeted.

**Perceptions of migration:** A combination of rising numbers of migrants combined with worsening economic conditions are often a source of tension. Research suggests that fears are often exaggerated by widespread misperceptions regarding actual figures and facts. The challenge for PIDC members is to continue to improve the collection of data and the timely publication of reliable migration statistics in order to provide an evidence base for policy development and to shape public debate.

**Human trafficking and people smuggling:** While the majority of people crossing borders will continue to be low risk, comprising citizens, residents, tourists, business travellers, and development workers, a small proportion will continue to be of higher risk. Identifying and appropriately responding is both a current and a future challenge. Immigration departments are increasingly expected to work with police to be prepared for and to identify more serious cases of people smuggling and human trafficking, potentially involving criminal networks. Multilateral forums such as the Bali Process will be increasingly important for Pacific Island countries to engage in to be able to effectively counter these crimes.

**Other transnational organised crime:** There are strong indications that Pacific Island countries are increasingly targeted by criminal groups due to their geographical location between major sources and destinations of illicit commodities, their extensive and porous jurisdictional boundaries, and the differences and variability in governance and law enforcement capacity across the region. The four main types of transnational organised crime

affecting the Pacific region in 2016 were: drug and precursor trafficking, the trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, environmental crimes (fishery crime and other wildlife trafficking, and illegal logging and timber trafficking); and small arms trafficking.

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These identified trends in migration policy do not represent an exhaustive list, and will change over time. For some PIDC members individual trends may be more or less relevant or influential. Common to all of these trends is the important role immigration departments have to play in national policy development, and the necessity to work collaboratively and share information within and across agencies nationally, and regionally.

## Annex 1: Statistical Summaries

The following data is available at IOM's Migration Data Portal (<https://migrationdataportal.org/>). Data is sourced from UNDESA unless otherwise specified, and is provided by each country.

### Melanesia

	Melanesia	Fiji	Papua New Guinea	Solomon Islands	Vanuatu
Total population in 2018	10.4m	883,500	8.6m	652,900	292,700
Population ages 0-14 (% of total in 2018)	34.5%	28.3%	35.6%	38.5%	35.8%
Population growth in 2018 (%)	1.9%	0.7%	2%	2.6%	2.5%
Unemployment rate of total population (ILO, 2019)	4%	6.2%	2.7%	2.1%	5.2%
Youth unemployment (ILO, 2019)	9.6%	18.6%	5.1%	4.4%	10.5%
Total population projection for 2050 (Medium variant)	17.5m	1.1m	14.2m	1.3m	556,800
Total born in country/region resident overseas, 2019	453,200	222,600	219,100	4,200	7,300
Residents overseas as a percentage of population 2019 (Total number of emigrants)	4.3%	25.2%	2.5%	0.6%	2.5%
Total number of international migrants at mid-year 2019	123,600	14,000	31,200	2,500	3,200
International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population at mid-year, 2019	1.1%	1.6%	0.4%	0.4%	1.1%
Net migration (immigrants minus emigrants) in the 5 years prior to 2019	-39,900	-31,000	-4,000	-8,000	600
Share of female migrants in international migrant stock at mid-year, 2019	45.3%	46%	39.3%	43.9%	50.3%
Difference in the proportion of migrants in the total population between 2000 and 2019	-0.1%age points	0%age points	-0.1%	-0.6%	-0.3%



Share of international migrants 19 years and younger residing in the country/region at mid-year 2019	19.6%	22.4%	34.5%	20.8%	26.1%
Share of international migrants 65 years and older at mid-year, 2019	11.8%	9.4%	5.5%	9%	6.7%
Total number of refugees in host region / country in 2020 (UNHCR)	9,700	13	9,700	-	-
Personal remittances received (as % of GDP) in 2020 (World Bank)	-	5%	0%	1.3%	3.7%

## Micronesia

	Micronesia	FSM	Kiribati	RMI	Nauru	Palau
Total population in 2018	317,500	112,600	115,800	58,400	12,700	17,900
Population ages 0-14 (% of total in 2018)	34%	32.7%	35.3%	-	-	-
Population growth in 2018 (%)	0.5%	1.1%	1.5%	0.6%	-1.3%	0.6%
Unemployment rate of total population (ILO, 2019)	-	-		-	-	-
Youth unemployment (ILO, 2019)	-	-		-	-	-
Total population projection for 2050 (Medium variant)	674,300	138,900	176,700	75,400	10,800	17,700
Total born in country/region resident overseas, 2019	-	21,800	4,400	8,200	2,400	2,700
Residents overseas as a percentage of population 2019 (Total number of emigrants)	-	19.3%	3.8%	14%	18.9%	15%
Total number of international migrants at mid-year 2019	118,000	2,800	3,000	3,300	2,100	5,100

International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population at mid-year, 2019	21.7%	2.5%	2.6%	5.6%	19.7%	28.1%
Net migration (immigrants minus emigrants) in the 5 years prior to 2019	-14,800	-3,000	-4,000	-	-	-
Share of female migrants in international migrant stock at mid-year, 2019	49.5%	46.5%	47.3%	38.7%	43%	43.2%
Difference in the proportion of migrants in the total population between 2000 and 2019	-5.1%	-0.4%	-0.1%	1.9%	-3.5%	-4.9%
Share of international migrants 19 years and younger residing in the country/region at mid-year 2019	14.8%	22.1%	29.6%	25.8%	21.5%	9.2%
Share of international migrants 65 years and older at mid-year, 2019	7.7%	6.8%	3.2%	4.6%	7.9%	4.4%
Total number of refugees in host region / country in 2020 (UNHCR)	763	-	-	-	763	-
Personal remittances received (as % of GDP) in 2020 (World Bank)	-	6.1%	10.9%	14.3%	-	0.7%

## Polynesia

	Polynesia	Samoa	Tonga	Tuvalu
Total population in 2018	310,800	196,100	103,200	11,500
Population ages 0-14 (% of total in 2018)	35.9%	36.4%	35.4%	-
Population growth in 2018 (%)	0.9%	0.4%	1.2%	1.2%
Unemployment rate of total population (ILO, 2019)	4.6%	8.1%	1.2%	-
Youth unemployment (ILO, 2019)	10.4%	18.1%	2.7%	-
Total population projection for 2050 (Medium variant)	811,300	267,400	134,200	16,000

Total born in country/region resident overseas, 2019 (Total number of emigrants)	-	124,400	74,400	3,300
Residents overseas as a percentage of population 2019	-	63.4%	72%	28.7%
Total number of international migrants at mid-year 2019	68,400	4,000	3,800	238
International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population at mid-year, 2019	10.1%	2%	3.6%	2%
Net migration (immigrants minus emigrants) in the 5 years prior to 2019	-29,800	-14,000	-4,000	-
Share of female migrants in international migrant stock at mid-year, 2019	46.1%	49.5%	45.4%	45%
Difference in the proportion of migrants in the total population between 2000 and 2019	-1.4%	-1.4%	-0.2%	-0.3%
Share of international migrants 19 years and younger residing in the country/region at mid-year 2019	17.3%	44.7%	30.5%	25.6%
Share of international migrants 65 years and older at mid-year, 2019	9.4%	5.8%	4.8%	5.9%
Total number of refugees in host region / country in 2020 (UNHCR)	-	-	-	-
Personal remittances received (as % of GDP) in 2020 (World Bank)	-	16.2%	37.6%	9.7%

## Annex 2: List of Key Instruments

IOM's Global Compact Thematic Paper on Protection of Human Rights (2017d) provides a clear summary of all the key instruments relating to migrants and migration. The relevant paragraphs are presented here for ease of reference:

### **The normative framework**

The nine core international human rights treaties apply to all persons, including migrants. These are: the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. With the exception of very few political rights, migrants have the same rights as non-migrants, simply by being human beings. Moreover, international customary law, which applies to all States, including those that have not ratified relevant treaties, lays down certain rights and prohibitions that apply to all persons, including migrants. In times of conflict, the international humanitarian law norms applicable to non-combatants also apply to non-combatant persons, including migrants.

**Transnational criminal law** addresses criminal actions related to migration, particularly in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. The smuggling protocol aims to combat migrant smuggling and promote cooperation amongst State Parties, while protection provisions for migrants are cross-referenced in other international conventions. The trafficking protocol aims to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, protect and assist victims of trafficking with full respect for their human rights, and promote cooperation amongst State Parties. The rule of law and the effective implementation of legislation act as guarantors for a safe and enabling environment in which crime is reduced and victims given redress.

**International labour law** is of particular relevance to the rights of migrant workers. The Convention concerning Migration for Employment applies to the whole labour migration continuum from entry to return, including the conditions governing the orderly recruitment

of migrant workers. It also articulates the principle of their equal treatment with national workers regarding working conditions, trade union membership and enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining, accommodation, social security, employment taxes and legal proceedings relating to matters outlined in the convention. The Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers calls on States to suppress clandestine movements of migrants for employment and illegal employment of migrants and the organization of such movements, and to provide for equality of opportunity and treatment of legally resident migrant workers and their families with regard to employment, access to social security, trade union membership, cultural rights, and individual and collective freedoms for persons. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (which is also an international human rights instrument) establishes a comprehensive rights framework for migrant workers and their families and guidelines for promoting legal and humane migration channels.

### **The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development**

The 2030 Agenda (often abbreviated as “Sustainable Development Goals” or “SDGs”) is unequivocally anchored in human rights and is “to be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the obligations of States under international law” (para 18). This means that any gaps or ambiguities should be resolved in accordance with the requirements of international human rights law.

One of the Agenda’s key principles is to “leave no one behind” and “reach those furthest behind first” (para 4). It further calls for the follow-up and review processes for the SDGs to be based upon evidence and data disaggregated by “income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts” (para 74, and Target 17.18).

The SDGs recognize the vulnerability of migrants to exploitation and abuse, specifically through the targets related to countering human trafficking: Target 5.2 (eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation), Target 16.2 (end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children), and Target 8.7 (take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms).

### **The Migration Governance Framework**

The first principle of IOM’s Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) is adherence to international standards and the fulfilment of migrants’ rights: “humane and orderly migration requires compliance with international law. The obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the

rights of individuals is paramount and applies to all individuals within a State's territory, regardless of nationality or migration status and without discrimination, in order to preserve their safety, physical integrity, well-being and dignity. Protecting the rights of individuals includes combatting xenophobia, racism and discrimination, ensuring adherence with the principles of equality and non-discrimination, and ensuring access to protection.”

### **Migrants in vulnerable situations**

While the documents described above expressly recognize the obligation to protect and uphold the rights of migrants and address the needs of the most vulnerable, they do not define a vulnerable migrant or a migrant in a vulnerable situation. While some organizations have developed internal definitions, to date there is no internationally recognized definition, which contributes to potential protection gaps. This is addressed in the Sutherland Report, which proposes efforts to develop a working definition of ‘migrants in vulnerable situations’; and survey the applicable international legal frameworks and non-binding instruments to identify protection gaps.

The New York Declaration, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly following the 19 September 2016 High Level Meeting on Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, also refers to the vulnerabilities of migrants to exploitation and abuse, and notes States’ commitments to “protecting the safety, dignity and human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migratory status, at all times.” In the New York Declaration, States commit to consider the development of non-binding guiding principles and voluntary guidelines, consistent with international law, on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations, especially unaccompanied and separated children who do not qualify for international protection as refugees and who may need assistance.

The Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative generated voluntary guidelines and effective practices for States and other stakeholders to follow to protect and assist migrants in particularly vulnerable situations. Those where they are caught in conflict or natural disasters and, the Nansen Initiative, a State-led consultative process, resulted in the development of a protection agenda addressing the needs of people displaced due to natural disasters and the effects of climate change.

The Global Migration Group’s Principles and Guidelines, supported by practical guidance on the protection of human rights of migrants in vulnerable situations within large and/or mixed movements, recognize that there are multiple sources of migrant vulnerability. It provides a concise draft set of principles, guidelines, and practical guidance on protection of human rights in large and/or mixed movements, with a particular emphasis on the human rights protection gaps experienced by migrants in vulnerable situations.

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